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The conflict between pro-self and pro-social behaviour is at the core of many key problems of our time, 
as, for example, the reduction of air pollution and the redistribution of scarce resources. For the well-
being of our societies, it is thus crucial to find mechanisms to promote pro-social choices over egoistic 
ones. Particularly important, because cheap and easy to implement, are those mechanisms that can 
change people’s behaviour without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives, the so-called “nudges”. Previous research has found that moral nudges (e.g., making norms 
salient) can promote pro-social behaviour. However, little is known about whether their effect persists 
over time and spills across context. This question is key in light of research showing that pro-social 
actions are often followed by selfish actions, thus suggesting that some moral manipulations may 
backfire. Here we present a class of simple moral nudges that have a great positive impact on pro-
sociality. In Studies 1–4 (total N = 1,400), we use economic games to demonstrate that asking subjects 
to self-report “what they think is the morally right thing to do” does not only increase pro-sociality 
in the choice immediately after, but also in subsequent choices, and even when the social context 
changes. In Study 5, we explore whether moral nudges promote charity donations to humanitarian 
organisations in a large (N = 1,800) crowdfunding campaign. We find that, in this context, moral nudges 
increase donations by about 44 percent.
Many decision problems involve a conflict between what is good for oneself and what is good for others. For 
example, reducing CO2 emissions, recycling, and donating to charity are all pro-social choices that are individually 
costly: they require people to pay a personal cost to benefit other people or the society as a whole1–4. Since indi-
viduals have an incentive to maximise their own benefit, finding mechanisms to reduce free-riding and promote 
pro-social behaviour is of great importance for the well-being of our society5–12.
One strand of literature has focused on mechanisms such as punishing free-riders13–16, rewarding pro-social 
actors17–19, and the interplay between these two20–23. While these approaches have been shown to promote 
pro-sociality, and punishment has been adopted by most countries to sanction free-riders, their drawback is 
that they are costly. For example, in order to punish self-regarding behaviour, institutions must first pay a cost to 
monitor people’s behaviour and find out who acted selfishly and who did not. Then they must pay a cost to punish 
those who acted selfishly. A similar drawback holds for rewarding pro-social actors. In order to reward pro-social 
actions, institutions must first pay a cost to monitor people’s actions and find out who acted pro-socially and who 
did not; then they must pay a cost to reward those who acted pro-socially.
Thus, particularly important, from the point of view of creating societal benefit, are those mechanisms that 
can change people’s behaviour without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives 
– the so-called “nudges”24,25. They are cheap and easy to implement, because they allow to avoid (i) the direct cost 
of changing people’s economic incentives and/or limiting people’s action space, (ii) the monitoring cost of finding 
out which choice each individual made and, possibly, the cost of punishing or rewarding each choice, and (iii) 
the technical difficulties associated with finding out individual choices. Thus, finding simple nudges that are able 
to increase pro-social behaviour is of great importance and could have impactful implications on policy design.
A large amount of research testifies of the considerable impact that norms can have on human behaviour in 
situations as diverse as charity donations26, alcohol consumption27, littering28, water consumption29, risky driv-
ing30, and many others. In short, this research suggests that people tend to follow the choice that they perceive to 
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be the norm in a given context, which, in turn, suggests that simple reminders that make the morality of an action 
salient may have a positive impact on pro-social behaviour. Along these lines, for example, it has been shown that 
religious reminders favour honesty31 and cooperation32,33 in economic games. Furthermore, changing the names 
of the available actions to make them seem less or more moral has a large effect on people’s behaviour in decision 
problems where there is a tension between equity and efficiency34,35.
Inspired by this line of research, in this paper, we explore the effect of simple “moral nudges” on pro-social 
behaviour in the context of economic games. In our typical experiment, participants have to decide between a 
pro-self and a pro-social course of action, but, before making their actual choice, they are asked what they think 
is the morally right thing to do. Besides investigating whether answering this question makes participants more 
pro-social in the given interaction, we also examine whether its effect persists over time and spills across contexts.
While previous research has consistently found that moral nudges and, more generally, norm-based policy 
interventions persist at least for some time33,36,37, there is a lot of uncertainty concerning their spillover effect 
across contexts. More specifically, to the best of our knowledge, no study has explored spillover effects in the 
domain of simple moral nudges as the ones we explore in this work. In the more general domain of policy inter-
ventions, previous empirical studies have led to mixed results, as they offered evidence of both negative and pos-
itive spillovers. In the realm of negative spillovers, previous research has shown that people donate less to charity 
directly after making a choice they consider moral than after a choice they consider immoral38, that “recalling 
one’s own (im)moral behaviour leads to compensatory rather than consistent moral action”39, that “people act less 
altruistically and are more likely to cheat and steal after purchasing green products than after purchasing conven-
tional products”40, that “people are more willing to express attitudes that could be viewed as prejudiced when their 
past behaviour has established their credentials as nonprejudiced persons”41. See also refs42–45. In the realm of 
positive spillovers, it has been shown that costly investments in social image generate positive spillovers in terms 
of generosity later on46, that previously established cooperative precedents lead to higher cooperation in subse-
quent games47–50, that cooperative behaviour learned in a particularly cooperative setting spills over to a number 
of other settings involving pro-sociality50, and that different pro-social behaviours are all positively correlated51–54.
In this work, we first demonstrate that results from previous related literature extend to the domain of our 
moral nudges. In particular, we show that moral nudges have a positive effect on the choice immediately after the 
nudge (Study 1–2) and that their effect persists to a second interaction (Study 3). Then, we go beyond previous 
literature by showing that the effect of moral nudges spill across contexts (Study 4).
Additionally, we also explore whether our moral nudges can be used to increase charity donations to real 
humanitarian organisations. The motivation for exploring this question comes from the fact that whether behav-
iour in economic games reflects behaviour in real life or not is still debated, with some studies finding a positive 
association55–59, whereas others challenge this view by reporting only a weak association, if any at all60–62. Thus, to 
strengthen our conclusions, we also provide a demonstration that moral nudges can be used to increase charity 
donations to real humanitarian organisations: in Study 5, we find that, in our setting, moral nudges significantly 
increase charity donations by 44%.
Study 1
We begin by exploring whether moral nudges are effective in increasing altruistic behaviour in the Dictator Game 
(DG), a simple economic game standardly used to measure individuals’ altruistic attitudes59,63.
For this and the following experiments, informed consent is obtained by all participants and their anonym-
ity is ensured. The experiments were carried out in accordance with relevant guidelines and regulations. These 
experiments were conducted when all authors were affiliated to the University of Amsterdam. According to the 
Dutch legislation, this is a non-NWO study, that is (i) it does not involve medical research and (ii) participants 
are not asked to follow rules of behaviour. See http://www.ccmo.nl/ attachments/files/wmo-engelse-vertaling-29-
7-2013-afkomstig-van- vws.pdf, §1, Article 1b, for an English translation of the Medical Research Act. Thus (see 
http://www.ccmo.nl/en/non-wmo- research) the only legislations which apply are the Agreement on Medical 
Treatment Act, from the Dutch Civil Code (Book 7, title 7, §5), and the Personal Data Protection Act (a link to 
which can be found in the previous webpage). All the studies presented in this work conform to both regulations.
Subjects. We recruit N = 300 subjects living in the US using the online labour market Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (AMT). AMT experiments are easy and cheap to implement, because subjects participate from their homes 
by simply completing an online incentivized survey that takes no more than a few minutes. This allows research-
ers to significantly decrease the stakes of the experiment, without compromising the results. Several studies have 
indeed shown that data gathered using AMT are of no less quality than data gathered using the standard physical 
lab64–69. Moreover, as an upside with respect to standard laboratory experiments, AMT experiments use samples 
that are more heterogeneous than the standard laboratory experiments, that are typically conducted using a pool 
of students67. Other studies have pointed out to potential problems in collecting data on AMT, including the 
presence of experienced subjects, who may be unaffected by experimental manipulations and thus may decrease 
effect sizes70 or the presence of AMT workers using Virtual Private Servers (VPS) to participate multiple times 
in an experiment71. To increase data quality, we recruited subjects with an AMT approval rate greater than 90% 
(AMT keeps track of this information and allows experimenters to filter subjects accordingly) and we also asked 
subjects comprehension questions during the survey to make sure that they understood the crucial parts of the 
experiment. In particular, we asked which choice maximizes the subject’s payoff and which choice maximizes 
other subjects’ payoff. In this way, we made sure that subjects who pass the comprehension questions have a 
clear understanding of the conflict between the pro-self and the pro-social choice that characterizes our deci-
sion problems. Subjects who failed the comprehension question were automatically excluded from the survey. 
Comprehension questions were asked before the moral nudge manipulation as to avoid any risk of differential 
attrition across conditions. In order to minimize the effect of potential duplicates, after collecting the data, we 
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checked for multiple IP addresses and multiple AMT IDs. In those cases where we found any duplicates, we kept 
only the first observation (as determined by the starting date) and we discarded the remaining ones. We did not 
take any measure of experience in AMT experiments to identify a possible decrease in effect sizes due to the 
presence of experienced subjects. Thus, our results are likely to represent a lower bound of the true effect sizes.
procedure. After entering their AMT IDs, subjects are given 20c and are told they are paired with another 
subject who is given nothing. They are also told that they can donate any part of their endowment to the other 
subject (available choices: 0c, 2c, 4c, …, 18c, 20c). To make sure they understand the situation, we ask all subjects 
two comprehension questions regarding what choice would maximise their payoff and what choice would max-
imise the other person’s payoff. Only those who answer both comprehension questions correctly are allowed to 
proceed to the experiment. Subjects are randomly divided in three conditions: DG, DGpersonal, DGdescriptive. 
The DG condition is the baseline: subjects are asked how much, if any, they want to donate to the other person. 
In the DGpersonal condition, right before asking subjects to state their donation, we ask them: “what do you 
personally think is the morally right thing to do in this situation?” In the DGdescriptive condition, right before 
asking subjects to state their donation, we ask them: “what do you think your society considers to be the morally 
right thing to do in this situation?” After making a choice, subjects enter a standard demographic questionnaire. 
After the questionnaire, subjects receive the completion code of the survey through which they can claim their 
bonus, that is paid on top of the participation fee (that is 40c). We refer to the Supplementary Material, Part SM2, 
for full experimental instructions.
Results. Excluding subjects who did not pass the comprehension questions or completed the survey more 
than once (for whom we keep only the first observation), we remain with N = 282 subjects. Exclusion rates in this 
study and the following studies are in line with those of other published studies using the DG and the PD65. The 
results are visualised in Fig. 1, where “% pro-sociality” stands for average percentage of the endowment donated 
by all players in the given condition. Since linear regression predicting “pro-sociality” as a function of a dummy 
variable that represents whether a subject participated in the DGpersonal condition or in the DGdescriptive condi-
tion finds no significant difference between DGpersonal and DGdescriptive (p = 0.473), we merge these two con-
ditions to form the DGnudged condition. When nudging subjects, average percentage of the endowment donated 
increases from 21.2% in the DG to 30.6% in the DGnudged. The increase is statistically significant, as shown by 
linear regression predicting pro-sociality as a function of a dummy variable that represents whether an individ-
ual participated in DGnudged or in the standard DG (p = 0.005). Thus, our first study shows that moral nudges 
have a positive impact on altruistic behaviour in the standard DG (see Supplementary Material, Table SM1, for 
regression details).
Study 2
Next, we examine whether moral nudges have a positive effect also on cooperative behaviour. We design a new 
experiment in which the DG is replaced by a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), an economic game standardly used to 
measure individuals’ cooperative attitudes56,72.
Subjects. We recruit N = 300 subjects living in the US and with an AMT approval rate greater than 90% using 
the online labour market AMT. None of these subjects participated in the previous study.
procedure. This study is identical to Study 1, apart from two changes. The first one is that the Dictator Game 
is replaced by a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). In the PD, subjects are given 10c and are asked whether they want 
to keep it or give it to the other person. In the latter case, the 10c are doubled and earned by the other person. 
Figure 1. Moral nudges increase altruistic behaviour in Dictator games. Results of Study 1 (N = 282). Subjects 
who are asked what they personally think is the morally right thing to do or what they think their society 
considers to be the morally right thing to do before playing a DG (i.e., subjects in the “DG nudged” condition), 
donate significantly more than subjects in the baseline DG (p = 0.005). The y-axis represents the average 
percentage of the endowment donated by subjects in the corresponding condition. Error bars represent +/− 
Standard Error of the Mean (SEM). We refer to the Supplementary Material, Table SM1, for regression details.
4Scientific RepoRtS |         (2019) 9:11880  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-48094-4
www.nature.com/scientificreportswww.nature.com/scientificreports/
Importantly, participants are informed that the other person is facing exactly the same set of instructions. Thus, 
each participant gets a better payoff if they keep the money (defect), but, if both participants keep the money, 
then they only get 10c each, which is less than the 20c each that they would get if they both gave the money away 
(cooperate). Previous research suggests that cooperative behaviour is different from altruistic behaviour; specif-
ically, people who act altruistically in DG typically cooperate in PD, but not the converse51. The second change is 
that, in order to participate in the experiment, subjects have to answer four comprehension questions, instead of 
two. We refer to the Supplementary Material, Part SM2, for full experimental instructions.
Results. Excluding subjects who did not pass the comprehension questions or completed the survey more 
than once, we remain with N = 257 subjects. As before, we build PDnudged, by merging PDpersonal with 
PDdescriptive, because linear regression shows that the rate of cooperation in the PDpersonal condition is not 
statistically different from the rate of cooperation in the PDdescriptive condition (p = 0.327). Results are visualised 
in Fig. 2, where “% pro-sociality” stands for the average percentage of one’s own endowment given to the other 
player. It is clear that results are in line with those of the previous experiment: the baseline leads to the lowest aver-
age giving (32.9%), while PDnudged give rise to a significantly higher levels of giving (48.0%, linear regression, 
p = 0.023). (Despite the fact that cooperation in the Prisoner’s dilemma is a binary variable, we decided to use 
linear regression instead of logistic regression to favour comparability of effect sizes across studies (see Study 4). 
In any case, the results remain qualitatively the same when using logistic regression instead of linear regression. 
In particular, instead of getting p = 0.023, we get p = 0.024, when using logistic regression). Thus, our second 
study shows that moral nudges have a positive impact on cooperative behaviour in standard economic games (see 
Supplementary Material, Table SM2, for regression details).
Study 3
Then we investigate whether the positive effect of moral nudges is limited to the choice immediately after the 
nudge, or persists to a subsequent interaction. In this study we focus only on altruistic behaviour for two reasons: 
first, Dal Bó & Dal Bó33 have already shown that a similar moral nudge persists over time in a repeated PD; sec-
ond, Study 1 and Study 2 suggest that our moral nudges work similarly in the PD and the DG, therefore, although 
we cannot logically infer that our moral nudges equally persist to a second round both in the DG and in the PD, 
we expect no major differences. And, moreover, we focus only on the “personal” norm since, as shown in Studies 
1 and 2, the “social” norm gives rise to similar results. Thus, we expect no major differences between the two 
norms.
Subjects. We recruit N = 200 subjects living in the US and with an AMT approval rate greater than 90% using 
the online labour market AMT. None of these subjects participated in the previous study.
procedure. Subjects played a two-stage experiment as follows. In Stage 1, they face a DG in either of two 
conditions: DG and DGpersonal, identical to those in the first study. In Stage 2, all subjects play a standard 
non-nudged dictator game, denoted DG2, but with slightly different instructions than the first-stage DG: dicta-
tors are given 40c (instead of 20c) and the available donations are multiple of 4c (instead of 2c). We opt for this 
variant of the DG in order to avoid that people anchor their second choice to the first one73, causing a confound 
that would be in the same direction as the effect that we expect to find.
Results. Excluding subjects who did not pass the comprehension questions or completed the survey more 
than once, we remain with N = 172 subjects. Figure 3 shows that the percentage of altruism in DG2 after DG is 
significantly lower than the percentage of altruism in DG2 after DGpersonal (18.0% vs 25.5%; linear regression 
predicting DG2 choice as a function of a dummy variable that represents whether in the first stage a participant 
Figure 2. Moral nudges increase cooperative behaviour in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Results of Study 2 
(N = 257). Subjects who are asked what they personally think is the morally right thing to do or what they 
think their society considers to be the morally right thing to do before playing a PD (i.e., subjects in the “PD 
nudged” condition), give significantly more than subjects in the baseline PD (p = 0.023). The y-axis represents 
the average percentage of the endowment given by subjects in the corresponding condition. Error bars represent 
+/− SEM. We refer to the Supplementary Material, Table SM2, for regression details.
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participated in DG or DGpersonal, p = 0.019). Thus, our third study shows that the positive impact of moral 
nudges on altruistic behaviour is not limited to the choice immediately after the nudge, but persists to at least one 
other choice (see Supplementary Material, Table SM3, for regression details).
Study 4
Next, we explore whether the positive effect of moral nudges spills across contexts, in the sense that a moral nudge 
in the DG impacts also a subsequent PD and, conversely, a moral nudge in the PD impacts also a subsequent DG.
Subjects. We recruit N = 600 subjects living in the US and with an AMT approval rate greater than 90% using 
the online labour market AMT. None of these subjects participated in the previous study.
procedure. Subjects are randomly divided in six conditions: DG-PD, DGpersonal-PD, DGdescriptive-PD, 
PD-DG, PDpersonal-DG, and PDdescriptive-DG, where the notation X-Y means that subjects first play game X 
and then play game Y. The various DG and PD conditions were identical to those in the previous studies. The DG 
was conducted with an endowment of 20c and the available choices were: 0c, 2c, 4c, …, 18c, 20c.
Results. Excluding subjects who did not pass the comprehension questions or completed the survey more 
than once, we remain with N = 537 subjects. Direct effects of the moral nudges in Stage 1 behaviour are in line 
with those in the previous studies. We refer to the Supplementary Material, Table SM4, for statistical details. Here 
we focus on the spillover effects. Figure 4 compares the percentage of the amount given in Stage 2 after the neutral 
condition with the percentage of the amount given in Stage 2 after the nudged conditions (i.e., in the “neutral” 
column we collapse Stage 2 behaviour in PD-DG with Stage 2 behaviour in DG-PD, of course after renormal-
izing the data such that Stage 2 behaviour is expressed as a proportion of the amount given to the other player; 
similarly, in the “nudged” column, we collapse second-game behaviours in the conditions PDdescriptive-DG, 
PDpersonal-DG, DGdescriptive-PD, DGpersonal-PD). Figure 4 provides a first piece of evidence that moral 
nudges spill across contexts, as the average pro-sociality in Stage 2 increases from 30.9% to 36.8% when Stage 2 is 
preceded by a nudge compared to when it is not. To formally show the existence of an overall spillover effect, we 
use standard meta-analytic techniques as follows. First of all, we use second-stage linear regression, in which the 
effect of moral nudges on Stage 2 behaviour is described as a proportion of the effect of moral nudges on Stage 
1, to compute the single effects. When taken singularly, the effects are not significant (PD after DG vs PD after 
DGpersonal: p = 0.110; PD after DG vs PD after DGdescriptive: p = 0.309; DG after PD vs DG after PDdescriptive: 
p = 0.348; DG after PD vs DG after PDpersonal: p = 0.889). The fact that each of these effects is not significant 
is not surprising, as one may expect that the spillover effect across conditions, if present, will only constitute a 
proportion of the direct effect. Indeed, to shed light on whether a significant proportion of the direct effect spills 
over across conditions, we conduct a meta-analysis of the four effect sizes (using the Stata command: metan 
effect standard_error). In doing so, we indeed find a statistically significant overall effect, whose effect size is also 
relatively large (overall effect size = 0.633, 95% CI [0.047,1.219], Z = 2.12, p = 0.034). In sum, our fourth study 
shows that a significant proportion of the original direct effect of moral nudges on first-stage behaviour spills over 
across contexts in second-stage behaviour (see Supplementary Material, Table SM5, for regression details, and 
Supplementary Material, Fig. SM1, for the forest plot of the meta-analysis).
Study 5
We now provide a demonstration that our mechanism can be used to increase charity donations to real humani-
tarian organisations, at least in the context of a crowdfunding campaign conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Figure 3. Moral nudges increase altruistic behaviour in a subsequent Dictator Game. Results of Study 3 
(N = 172). The positive effect of moral nudges on altruistic behaviour in the DG is not limited to the choice 
immediately after the nudge, but persists to a second-stage DG, such that subjects who are nudged in Stage 1 
DG donate, in a second stage DG, more than those who are not nudged (p = 0.019). The y-axis represents the 
average percentage of the endowment donated by subjects in the corresponding condition. Error bars represent 
+/− SEM. We refer to the Supplementary Material, Table SM3, for regression details.
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Subjects. We recruit N = 1,800 subjects living in the US and with an AMT approval rate greater than 90% 
using the online labour market AMT. None of these subjects participated in the previous studies.
procedure. We conduct three sessions, differing by small details, as detailed in the next paragraph, with the 
same basic structure. First, all subjects complete a 5-minute survey for 50c (the participation fee). Then they 
are divided between two conditions: a baseline condition and a moral nudge condition (see next paragraph for 
more details about the implementation of the nudges). Finally, they are divided between two more conditions, 
Emergency and Give for France. In the Emergency condition they are asked whether they want to donate part of 
their 50c to Emergency, a humanitarian NGO that provides emergency medical treatment to victims of war. In 
the Give for France condition, they are asked whether they want to donate part of their 50c to Give for France, 
an organization in support of the victims of the July 14, 2016 Nice attack. These experiments were conducted 
between July 15 and July 17, 2016.
The three sessions differ only in two aspects. In Session 1, subjects can donate only 0c or 50c (i.e., they either 
donate the whole participation fee, or they donate nothing) while in Sessions 2 and 3 they can donate any part of 
their 50c (i.e., the money they donate are still taken from the participation fee, but they can decide to donate any 
amount between 0c and 50c). Subjects who decide to donate a part of their 50c are asked to abandon the current 
AMT survey and join a “bonus survey” in which we pay the amount that they decide not to donate as a bonus. 
No deception is used and the donations are really sent to the corresponding organisations. The second difference 
regards the way the nudge is implemented. Session 1. In the baseline condition, after the 5-minute survey, subjects 
are told: “thanks for answering our questions”; in the nudged condition, subjects are asked what they think is the 
morally right thing to do when they see a stranger in need (available answers: help/don’t help). Session 2. The 
baseline condition is the same as Session 1. In the nudged condition, participants are shown the instructions of a 
DG and are asked what they think is the morally right thing to do in that situation. Comprehension questions on 
the DG are not asked. Session 3. Identical to Session 2, but we add two comprehension questions for the DG (the 
same as in Study 1). In order to avoid selection effects, we add two comprehension questions also in the baseline 
condition, that are mathematically equivalent to the questions used in the nudged condition. Specifically, we 
ask subjects what number x would maximise the expression 20 – x, and what number would minimise the same 
expression. We refer to the Supplementary Material, Part SM2, for full experimental instructions.
Results. Excluding subjects who did not pass the comprehension questions or completed the survey more 
than once, we remain with N = 1,662 subjects. The results, plotted in Fig. 5, provide clear evidence that morally 
nudged subjects give, on average, more than those in the baseline. This is confirmed by linear regression that pre-
dicts giving as a function of a dummy variable that represents whether a participant participated in the baseline 
condition or in the morally nudged condition (Emergency: 17.9% vs 11.7%, p = 0.029; Give for France: 26.1% vs 
16.6%, p = 0.001). The coefficients of the regressions reveal that, in the Emergency condition, donations among 
nudged subjects are 39% higher than donations among non-nudged subjects, whereas, in the Give for France con-
dition, donations among nudged subjects are 47% higher than donations among non-nudged subjects. Merging 
the two conditions (Emergency and Give for France), we find that moral nudges increase charity donations by 
about 44%, on average.
Figure 4. Moral nudges spill across contexts. Results of Study 4, second stage game (N = 537). Subjects who are 
nudged in a first-stage DG (resp. PD) tend to be more pro-social in a subsequent non-nudged PD (resp. DG) 
than those who are not nudged. A meta-analysis of the four conditions yields a significant positive spillover 
effect whose size is also relatively large (overall effect size = 0.633, 95% CI [0.047,1.219], Z = 2.12, p = 0.034), 
providing evidence that a significant proportion of the effect of moral nudges on first-stage behaviour spills 
across contexts. The y-axis represents the average percentage of the endowment given by subjects in second-
stage game in the corresponding first-stage condition. Error bars represent +/− SEM. We refer to the 
Supplementary Material, Table SM5, for regression details, and Fig. A1, for the forest plot of the meta-analysis.
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Discussion
Finding mechanisms to promote pro-social behaviour is fundamental for the well-being of our societies and is 
more urgent than ever in a time of key global challenges such as resource conservation, climate change, and social 
inequalities1–23. Among these mechanisms, especially important, because easy and cheap to implement, are the 
so-called nudges, that is, mechanisms that can promote pro-social behaviour, without changing people’s action 
space and their economic incentives24,25.
Here we focused on moral nudges. In our experiments, participants had to decide between a pro-self and a 
pro-social course of action, but, before making their actual choice, they were asked what they think is or what they 
think others consider to be the morally right thing to do. Our data show that these moral nudges have a positive 
impact on altruistic (Study 1) and cooperative (Study 2) behaviour in economic games. This positive impact is not 
limited to the choice made immediately after the nudge but persists to a second interaction (Study 3). Moreover, 
a significant proportion of this effect even spills across contexts: nudging altruism in a first interaction promotes 
cooperation in a second, non-nudged, interaction, and nudging cooperation in a first interaction promotes altru-
ism in a second, non-nudged, interaction (Study 4). Furthermore, this positive impact is not limited to economic 
games: nudging altruistic behaviour can be used to successfully increase charity donations (Study 5).
This is an important improvement over previous work. Although it has been repeatedly shown that people 
tend to follow what they perceive to be the norm in a given context26–35, there is still a lot of uncertainty about the 
effects of moral nudges, especially concerning their spillover effects across contexts. This question is particularly 
important in light of previous literature offering evidence of both positive46–50 and negative spillovers. In particu-
lar, negative spillovers are reported in the literature on moral cleansing, which shows that moral actions are often 
followed by compensatory immoral actions, suggesting that some moral nudges may backfire38–42. Our results 
show that this is not the case, at least for the moral nudges, the window of time, and the economic decisions con-
sidered in this paper. Not only do our moral nudges not backfire, but they even persist over time and spill across 
contexts.
To the best of our knowledge, only two papers have previously considered moral nudges of the type we have 
used in this work. Brañas-Garza74 found that telling DG dictators to “note that he relies on you” increases dona-
tions in the laboratory. We go beyond the results of this paper along several dimensions, as we explore the effect 
of moral nudges, both in the DG and in the PD, we look at its persistence over interactions and across contexts; 
and we also look at its effect on crowdfunding charity donations to humanitarian organisations. Dal Bó and Dal 
Bó33, instead, found that reminding the “Golden Rule” in the middle of a repeated PD with random re-matching 
in groups of eight people and feedback after each round increases cooperation for a few rounds before eventu-
ally vanishing. However, the fact that the interaction is repeated in small groups with feedback after each round 
implies that the persistence of the increase in cooperation cannot be attributed to the persistence of the nudge 
with certainty. For example, it could be driven by reputation, if, for example, subjects play a Tit-for-Tat strategy 
conditional on the strategy they encountered in the previous interaction. We thus go much beyond the results 
by Dal Bó and Dal Bó33, in several ways: we look at the effect of moral nudges also in the DG, at its persistence 
across interactions while giving no feedback about the previous interaction (and therefore ruling out the potential 
confound of conditional strategies), at its persistence across contexts, and at its effect on crowdfunding charity 
donations to humanitarian organisations.
Figure 5. Moral nudges increase charity donations to real non-profit organisations. Results of Study 5 
(N = 1,662). Morally nudged subjects donate significantly more to humanitarian organisations than those who 
are not morally nudged. This holds both when the target organisation is Emergency (in which case average 
donations increase from 5.85c to 8.29c; coeff = 2.28, p = 0.029) and Give for France (in which case average 
donations increase from 8.93c to 13.04c; coeff = 4.20, p = 0.001). The coefficients are, respectively, 39% and 47% 
of the baseline donation. Merging the two conditions (Emergency and Give for France) reveals that, overall, 
nudging subjects increase donations by 44%. The y-axis represents the average percentage of charity donation 
by subjects in the corresponding condition. Error bars represent +/− SEM.
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Our results have potentially impactful applications for policy design. Several mechanisms to promote 
pro-social behaviour have been explored in previous work, including giving material reward, such as a t-shirt or 
a mug, in exchange to a pro-social action75,76, augmenting donations using matching77,78, making people’s actions 
observable by others79,80, informing people about the actions of others to make a social norm salient81,82, giving 
gifts while asking for a donation, in order to induce a reciprocal feeling of obligation83,84, soliciting people to 
cooperate85,86, and many others (see Kraft-Todd et al.6 for a review). Our results expand this list of mechanisms 
significantly. We show that moral nudges not only increase pro-social behaviour in the choice immediately after 
the nudge, but that their effect also persists over time and spills across contexts. Furthermore, compared to these 
studies, moral nudges have the crucial upside that they are extremely easy and cheap to implement, while still 
being very effective. For example, Landry et al.87 entered people who donated to a fund-raiser into a lottery to 
win a personal cash prize, and found a 47% increase in the amount of money raised relative to the control con-
dition with no lottery. Our Study 5 shows that moral nudges produce – at least in the domain of crowdfunding 
donations in which we used them – essentially the same increase (44%), but are free of cost, that is, they allow to 
save the money for the prize of the lottery and the time needed to organise it and conduct it. This implies that our 
moral nudges might be a promising tool for crowdfunding charity donations to humanitarian organisations. This 
is an especially interesting application, in light of the emergence of crowdfunding websites such as gofundme.
com, kickstarter.com, and donationcrowdfunding.com. Of course, the fact that our moral nudges work well in 
increasing donations for crowdfunding does not imply that they also work well in promoting everyday pro-social 
behaviour in other parts of life. Exploring the external validity of moral nudges is an important direction for 
future work.
Our findings also have some limitations. First of all, they show that moral nudges increase pro-social behav-
iour, persist over time, and spill across contexts, but only within the window of time and choices considered in 
this paper, that is, two interactions (DG and PD) within the same experiment (i.e., separated by a few minutes). 
Future work should thus consider interactions separated by a longer time span and a greater number of interac-
tions to explore the boundaries of the effectiveness of moral nudges. Furthermore, it is to be expected that the 
effectiveness of a moral nudge will not only depend on the particular type of nudge used, but also on the underly-
ing social interactions. Thus, more generally, classifying moral nudges in terms of their effectiveness in different 
social interactions is an important direction for future research, with many applications to policy design. Second, 
especially Studies 1–4 use very small stakes, thus it is not clear if and how our results generalise to larger stakes. 
However, we believe that this is not a major limitation because previous literature found that people’s behaviour 
in AMT experiments using small stakes is essentially equivalent to behaviour in experiments using standard 
lab stakes both in the DG and in the PD88–90 (See ref.90 for a review). Additionally, our first session of Study 5 
uses larger stakes and finds results that are in line with the other studies. Here the pro-social choice is relatively 
expensive, because we asked participants to donate the whole participation fee (50 cents), and we do so at the 
very end of the survey. This adds to the monetary cost of the altruistic action, a non-monetary utility associated 
with the sense of deservedness of the participation fee, which decreases the attitude to donate91. Even in this 
“extreme” case, we find a significant effect of the moral nudge (coeff = 4.899, p = 0.018). Third, our experiments 
do not allow us to draw conclusions about the psychological underpinnings of our effects. Do people change their 
behaviour because they are motivated by a sincere desire of doing what they think is the morally right thing to 
do? Or, alternatively, do they change their behaviour because the experimental setting makes it salient that there 
is an appropriate thing to do? Indeed, the effect of the moral nudges in our experiments might have been driven 
by an experimenter demand effect92. This is not an issue, however, because susceptibility to experimenter demand 
effects can be thought of as an instance of norm-sensitivity93. Another potential explanation for our results is that 
they are driven by reputation: it could be that moral nudges make reputation salient, and that this ultimately has 
the effect of increasing pro-sociality. At this stage, our findings only allow us to conclude that moral nudges can be 
used effectively to increase pro-social behaviour (cf. especially Study 5). We named them “moral nudges” because 
they literally refer to morality, but this name is not meant to refer to the underlying psychological mechanism 
that makes these nudges effective. Understanding the psychological underpinnings of our effect is an interesting 
direction for future research. Fourth, our experiment does not control for subjects’ level of experience in similar 
AMT experiments. As noted in previous research70, experienced subjects may decrease effect sizes due to the 
fact that they are more resistant to experimental manipulations. This implies that the size of the positive effect of 
moral nudges reported in this work is likely to be a lower bound of its true size. Fifth, Study 5 shows that moral 
nudges increase charitable donations in the domain of gains, that is, in cases in which participants are asked to 
donate a sum of money that they have just earned. Future work should explore whether the same nudges work 
also in the domain of losses, that is, in situations in which participants are nudged to donate a sum of money that 
they already possess. Sixth, we analysed the effect on pro-sociality of only two moral nudges: a nudge meant to 
make the personal norm94 salient (“what do you think is the morally right thing to do?”) and a nudge meant to 
make the descriptive norm28 salient (“what do you think your society considers to be the morally right thing to 
do?”). Future research should extend this approach by investigating other ways to activate the same type of norms 
or even other norms, as for example, prescriptive norms (“what do you think your society thinks that you should 
do?”) or proscriptive norms (“what do you think your society thinks that you should not do?”).
Finally, our data also has theoretical applications. We have shown that people’s behaviour in one-shot anon-
ymous interactions can be influenced by moral nudges. This is in contrast to the predictions of the standard 
models proposed by behavioural economists to explain human pro-sociality in one-shot anonymous interac-
tions. According to these models, people have preferences for minimising social inequities95,96, or maximising 
social welfare97, or a combination of both97. These preferences are described in terms of the economic outcomes 
of the available actions and parameters representing the extent to which an individual cares about equity and/or 
efficiency. Therefore, these models predict that people should be insensitive to cues about the rightness or the 
wrongness of an action, because these cues do not change the economic outcomes of the available actions. This 
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prediction is not satisfied by our data: cues about what is right in a given situation can significantly change peo-
ple’s behaviour. Thus, our results highlight the necessity of going beyond outcome-based preferences, and speak 
in support of incorporating social norms into people’s preferences. This is in line with an emerging strand of 
research suggesting that people, in their decision-making, strive for balance between maximising their material 
payoff and doing what they think is the morally right thing to do34,35,93,98–102.
In sum, we have presented a novel technique to increase pro-social behaviour. Asking people “what’s the 
morally right thing to do?” before they make a choice, makes the morality of an action salient. This promotes 
pro-social behaviour, and this positive effect persists to a subsequent choice, even when the social context 
changes. Moreover, it can successfully be used to increase donations to charitable organizations in crowdfunding 
campaigns. These results hold within the natural domain of our experiments. Future research should explore 
potential generalisations, with a particular focus to larger stakes, longer time spans and a greater number of 
interactions.
Methods
We conducted five studies on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The detailed procedure of Study i is reported in the 
Main Text, in the Procedure subsection of the section named Study i. Verbatim experimental instructions of the 
five studies are reported in the Supplementary Information. The datasets of the five studies are reported in the 
Supplementary Dataset.
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